What mattered was that both men took advantage of the power vested in them as agents of Boca Raton to facilitate their abuse. Where this does not occur, supervisor status will generally be capable of resolution at summary judgment. For present purposes, the only relevant incidents concern Vance's interactions with a fellow BSU employee, Saundra Davis. Maetta Vance, an African-American woman, began working for Ball State University (BSU) in 1989 as a sub- stitute server in the University Banquet and Catering division of Dining Services. The United States, on the other hand, while applying the same open-ended test for supervisory status, reaches the opposite conclusion. would not have sufficient authority to qualify as a supervisor.” U. S. Brief 28 (quoting App. Petitioner’s reliance on colloquial uses. Faragher and Ellerth, by contrast, placed the burden squarely on the employer to make out the affirmative defense. But if no tangible employment action is taken, the employer may escape liability by establishing, as an affirmative defense, that (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the employer provided. He demanded that she work over the weekend despite her scheduled day off. See, e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F. 3d 116, 126–127 (CA2 2003); Whitten v. Fred’s, Inc., 601 F. 3d 231, 245–247 (CA4 2010); EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (1999), 1999 WL 33305874, *3 (hereinafter EEOC Guidance). See post, at 5, 8-12. But the Court can point to no evidence that jury instructions on supervisor status in jurisdictions following the EEOC Guidance have in fact proved unworkable or confusing to jurors. More important, petitioner is misguided in suggesting that we should approach the question presented here as if "supervisor" were a statutory term. Furthermore, as the EEOC perceived, in assessing an employee's qualification as a supervisor, context is often key. This Court, acting through Judge Barker, issued summary judgment in favor Dockets.Justia.com of Ball State in September 2008 (which the Seventh Circuit eventually upheld on appeal). Contrary to the dissent’s suggestions, see post, at 14, 17, this approach will not leave employees unprotected against harassment by co-workers who possess the authority to inflict psychological injury by assigning unpleasant tasks or by altering the work environment in objectionable ways. B. Lindemann & D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment in Employment Law 175 (1992). Pp. Petitioner is certainly right that the term is often used to refer to a person who has the authority to direct another’s work. in carrying out the harassment." I would follow the EEOC’s Guidance and hold that the authority to direct an employee’s daily activities establishes supervisory status under Title VII. If vicarious liability is confined to supervisors formally empowered to take tangible employment actions, however, employers will have a diminished incentive to train those who control their subordinates’ work activities and schedules, i.e., the supervisors who “actually interact” with employees. In words and conduct, Silverman and Terry made the beach a hostile place for women to work. She was the only African-American working in the department. But the term is also often closely tied to the authority to take what Ellerth and Faragher referred to as a "tangible employment action." tor, supra, at 72; Ellerth, supra, at 755. The Court looked to principles of agency law for guidance, but the Court concluded that the “malleable terminology” of the aided-in-the-commission principle counseled against the wholesale incorporation of that principle into Title VII case law. I continue to believe that Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775 (1998), were wrongly decided. Holding that Boca Raton was vicariously liable for Silverman’s harassment, id., at 808–809, the Court characterized him as Faragher’s supervisor, see id., at 780, and there was no dissent on that point, see id., at 810 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The vagueness of this standard was highlighted at oral argument when the attorney representing the United States was asked to apply that standard to the situation in Faragher, where the alleged harasser supposedly threatened to assign the plaintiff to clean the toilets in the lifeguard station for a year if she did not date him. Under any fair reading of Title VII, in each of the illustrative cases, the superior employee should have been classified a supervisor whose conduct would trigger vicarious liability.3, Within a year after the Court’s decisions in Faragher and Ellerth, the EEOC defined “supervisor” to include any employee with “authority to undertake or recommend tangible employment decisions,” or with “authority to di-rect [another] employee’s daily work activities.” EEOC Guidance 405:7654. 55, 76 (1994) (“Any jury instruction that attempts to shift the burden of per- suasion on closely related issues is never likely to be successful”). 15 Similarly, it is unclear whether Yasharay Mack ultimately would have prevailed even under the dissent’s definition of “supervisor.” The Second Circuit (adopting a definition similar to that advocated by the dissent) remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether Mack “ ‘unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.’ ” Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F. 3d 116, 127–128 (2003) (quoting Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 765). (internal quotation marks omitted). In line with those decisions, in 1999, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) provided enforcement guidance “regarding employer liability for harassment by supervisors based on sex, race, color, religion, national origin, age, disability, or protected activity.” EEOC, Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability For Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, 8 BNA FEP Manual 405:7651 (Feb. 2003) (hereinafter EEOC Guidance). Instead, they would have held that an employer is liable for any employee's creation of a hostile work environment "if, and only if, the plaintiff proves that the employer was negligent in permitting the [offending] conduct to occur." See Whitten, 601 F. 3d, at 236, 244-247 (internal quotation marks omitted). The interpretation of the concept of a supervisor that we  adopt today is one that can be readily applied. Socially this is a bit odd because the United States has a … See Stipulation and Order of Dismissal in No. 646 F. 3d, at 470–473. Holding that Boca Raton was vicariously liable for Silverman's harassment, id., at 808-809, the Court characterized him as Faragher's supervisor, see id., at 780, and there was no dissent on that point, see id., at 810 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Regrettably, the Court has seized upon Vance's thin case to narrow the definition of supervisor, and thereby manifestly limit Title VII's protections against workplace harassment. For example, Rhodes might have avoided summary judgment in favor of her employer; even so, it would have been open to the employer to raise and prove to a jury the Faragher/ Ellerth affirmative defense, see supra, at 3-4. If that discipline had economic consequences (such as suspension without pay), then Silverman might qualify as a supervisor under the definition we adopt today. Poladian forced her to wash her truck in sub-zero temperatures, assigned her undesirable yard work instead of road crew work, and prohibited another employee from fixing the malfunctioning heating system in her truck. Maetta Vance began working for University Dining Services at Ball State University in 1989 as a substitute server. 28; id., at 45, and Davis' job description does state that she supervises Kitchen Assistants and Substitutes and "[l]ead[s] and direct[s]" certain other employees, id., at 12-13. See Whitten v. Fred's, Inc., No. Two views have emerged. It also stands in stark contrast to the much broader … However, the dissent does not mention why the plaintiffs would lose in those cases. Vance complained that Davis “gave her a hard time at work by glaring at her, slamming pots and pans around her, and intimidating her.” Ibid. 1:00-cv-7778-LAP (SDNY, Oct. 21, 2004), Dkt. At issue in the case is whether the person who allegedly harassed Vance qualifies as a "supervisor" under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. of Transp., 359 F. 3d 498, 501–503, 506–507 (CA7 2004). Status of law prior to case holding: Prior to the Vance v. Ball State case, the law surrounding the definition of a “supervisor” was vague, but essentially relied on the traditional sense that the defense utilized in their argument. Title VII imposes no "general civility code." Vance v. Ball State University - SCOTUSblog. Her job description, in the Government’s view, is not dispositive, and the Government adds that it would not be enough for petitioner to show that Davis “occasionally took the lead in the kitchen.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31 (U. S. Brief). When employers know they will be answerable for the injuries a harassing jobsite boss inflicts, their incentive to provide preventative instruction is heightened. And another employee testified to believing that Davis was "a supervisor." Law. Following this decision, the lower courts generally held that an employer was liable for a racially hostile work environ- ment if the employer was negligent, i.e., if the employer knew or reasonably should have known about the harassment but failed to take remedial action. And although the dissent suggests that Donna Rhodes’ employer would have been liable under the dissent’s definition of “supervisor,” that is pure speculation: It is not clear that Rhodes suffered any tangible employment action, see Rhodes v. Illinois Dept. It has been the law for quite some time in the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, see, e.g., Noviello v. Boston, 398 F. 3d 76, 96 (CA1 2005); Weyers v. Lear Operations Corp., 359 F. 3d 1049, 1057 (CA8 2004); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F. 3d 1027, 1033-1034, and n. 1 (CA7 1998)--i.e., in Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. More specifically, who qualifies as a supervisor? 08-3568. that the holdings [in Faragher and Ellerth] apply with equal force to other types of harassment claims under Title VII"). ").6 The question of supervisory status, no less than the question whether retali-ation or harassment has occurred, "depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships." His authority to hire was subject to approval by higher management, Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U. S. 775, 781 (1998), and there is scant indication that he possessed other powers on the Court's list. See Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F. 3d 179, 186, n. 9 (CA4 2001) (citing cases reflecting “the developing consensus . 1:06-cv-01452-SEB-TAB (SD Ind., Oct. 3, 2006), Dkt. That threatened reassignment of duties likely would have constituted significantly different responsibilities for a lifeguard, whose job typically is to guard the beach. For that reason, a supervisor's authority must be "of a sufficient magnitude so as to assist the harasser . See App., O. T. 1997, No. As a consequence of the Court's truncated conception of supervisory authority, the Faragher and Ellerth framework has shifted in a decidedly employer-friendly direction. (b) Petitioner misreads Faragher and Ellerth in claiming that those cases support an expansive definition of “supervisor” because, in her view, at least some of the alleged harassers in those cases, whom the Court treated as supervisors, lacked the authority that the Seventh Circuit’s definition demands. In short, as Faragher and Ellerth recognized, harassment by supervisors is more likely to cause palpable harm and to persist unabated than similar conduct by fellow employees. See, e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F. 3d 116, 126-127 (CA2 2003); Whitten v. Fred's, Inc., 601 F. 3d 231, 245-247 (CA4 2010); EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors (1999), 1999 WL 33305874, *3 (hereinafter EEOC Guidance). In considering Ellerth and Faragher, we are met at the outset with petitioner's contention that at least some of the alleged harassers in those cases, whom we treated as supervisors, lacked the authority that the Seventh Circuit's definition demands. Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan join, dissenting. This provision obviously prohibits discrimination with respect to employment decisions that have direct economic consequences, such as termination, demotion, and pay cuts. That the Court has adopted a standard, rather than a clear rule, is not surprising, for no crisp definition of supervisor could supply the unwavering line the Court desires. Id., at 1-2. Argued November 26, 2012—Decided June 24, 2013. 109-4 LEIGH MASTER COPY II (DO NOT DELETE) 11/10/2015 4:46 PM 109:1053 (2015) The Cat’s Paw Supervisor 1055 Burlington Industries was liable unless it could establish the affirmative defense. They are mistaken. A second lead driver, David Goodman, later forced her into unwanted sex with him, an outrage to which she submitted, believing it necessary to gain a passing grade. 11-556 in the supreme court of the united states maetta vance, petitioner, v. ball state university, respondent. If the case were remanded, the Court of Appeals could resolve the hostile environment issue first, and then, if necessary, Davis’ status as supervisor or co-worker. We reject the nebulous definition of a "supervisor" advocated in the EEOC … We reject the nebulous definition of a “supervisor” advocated in the EEOC Guidance4 and substantially adopted by several courts of appeals. In any event, the dissent is wrong in claiming that our holding would preclude employer liability in other cases with facts similar to these. Even the traffic director tells the president of the company where to park his car’ ” (quoting NLRB v. Security Guard Serv., Inc., 384 F. 2d 143, 151 (CA5 1967))). Because supervisors are comparatively few, and employees are many, “the employer has a greater opportunity to guard against misconduct by supervisors than by common workers,” and a greater incentive to “screen [supervisors], train them, and monitor their performance.” Faragher, 524 U. S., at 803. Trainees like Starke were paired in a truck cabin with a single "lead driver" who lacked authority to hire, fire, promote, or demote, but who exercised control over the work environment for the duration of the trip. Courts and commentators alike have opined on the need for reasonably clear jury instructions in employment discrimination cases.13 And the danger of juror confusion  is particularly high where the jury is faced with instructions on alternative theories of liability under which different parties bear the burden of proof.14 By simplifying the process of determining who is a supervisor (and by extension, which liability rules apply to a given set of facts), the approach that we take will help to ensure that juries return verdicts that reflect the application of the correct legal rules to the facts. “Tangible employment actions fall within the special province of the supervisor. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 65-66 (1986) (describing development of hostile environment claims based on race). In a great many cases, it will be known even before litigation is commenced whether an alleged harasser was a supervi- sor, and in others, the alleged harasser’s status will become clear to both sides after discovery. As a precondition to vicarious employer liability, the EEOC explained, the harassing supervisor must wield authority of sufficient magnitude to enable the harassment. Even the traffic director tells the president of the company where to park his car' " (quoting NLRB v. Security Guard Serv., Inc., 384 F. 2d 143, 151 (CA5 1967))). See, e.g., Burlington Northern, 548 U. S., at 69 ("[T]he significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances. But he directed her activities, gave her tasks to accomplish, burdened her with undesirable work assignments, and controlled her schedule. The ball is once again in Congress’ court to correct the error into which this Court has fallen, and to restore the robust protections against workplace harassment the Court weakens today. The decision in most cases is documented in official company records, and may be subject to review by higher level supervisors.” Id., at 761–762. The Ellerth/Faragher framework draws a sharp line between co-workers and supervisors. 524 U. S., at 782-783. In contrast, if the harassing employee is a co-worker, a negligence standard applies. Pp. Maetta Vance, an African-American woman, began working for Ball State University (BSU) in 1989 as a substitute server in the University Banquet and Catering division of Dining Services. Furthermore, as the EEOC perceived, in assessing an employee’s qualification as a supervisor, context is often key. But under the dissent’s preferred approach, supervisor status hinges not on formal job titles or “paper descriptions” but on “specific facts about the working relationship.” Post, at 20–21 (internal quotation marks omitted). A party decided to to file a brief asking the Supreme Court to hear the Vance v. Ball State University case (trying the Court grants the party a writ of certiorari). With the issue still open when trial commences, the parties would be compelled to present evidence and argument on supervisor status, the affirmative defense, and the question of negligence, and the jury would have to grapple with all those issues as well. But see Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 767 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that, as a result of the Court’s decision in Ellerth, “employer liability under Title VII is judged by different standards depending upon whether a sexually or racially hostile work environment is alleged”). No. However, the dissent does not mention why the plaintiffs would lose in those cases. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . 10–14. Other courts have substantially followed the more open-ended approach advocated by the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance, which ties supervisor status to the ability to exercise significant direction over another's daily work. MAETTA VANCE, PETITIONER v. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY. In cases in which the harasser is a "supervisor," however, different rules apply. What Vance v. Ball State means for Future Employee Harassment Cases . This is generally referred to as “vicarious liability” — when the employer company or government is liable for the actions of its employees. . See post, at 7–8. Id., at 808 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). See id., at *12 (quoting Hall v. Bodine Elect. The second situation (which results in vicarious liability if the employer cannot make out the requisite affirmative defense) is present when no such tangible action is taken. Rather, the term was adopted by this Court in Ellerth and Faragher as a label for the class of employees whose misconduct may give rise to vicarious employer liability. “[V]icarious liability,” Ball State acknowledged, “also may be triggered when the harassing employee has the authority to control the victim’s daily work activities in a way that materially enables the harassment.” Id., at 1–2. *465 Diamond Z. Hirschauer (argued), Attorney, Tae Sture, Attorney, Sture Legal Services, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Vance herself testified that she did not know whether Davis was her supervisor. He was either an elevated coworker or a diminished supervisor.”). See EEOC Guidance 405:7652, 405:7654. The Court misses the point of the illustrations. 2434 (2013) addresses the circumstances under which an employer (i.e. If the case were remanded, the Court of Appeals could resolve the hostile environment issue first, and then, if necessary, Davis' status as supervisor or co-worker. Silverman's duties as a Marine Safety lieutenant included "making the lifeguards' daily assignments, and . United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. Yasharay Mack: Yasharay Mack, an African-American woman, worked for the Otis Elevator Company as an elevator mechanic's helper at the Metropolitan Life Building in New York City. Under Title VII, an employer’s liability for workplace harassment may depend on the status of the harasser. See Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 762. According to the dissent, the rule that we adopt is also inconsistent with our decision in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U. S. 129 (2004). A tangible employment decision requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act. On Whitten's first day of work, the manager, Matt Green, told her to "give [him] what [he] want[ed]" in order to obtain approval for long weekends off from work. The lower court did not even address this issue. . See Suders, 542 U. S., at 146 (citing Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 765; Faragher, 524 U. S., at 807). 97-282, p. 24 ("Supervisors typically exercise broad discretionary powers over their subordinates, determining many of the terms and conditions of their employment, including their raises and prospects for promotion and controlling or greatly influencing whether they are to be dismissed"). In general usage, the term “supervisor” lacks a suffi ciently specific meaning to be helpful for present purposes. Finally, petitioner argues that tying supervisor status to the authority to take tangible employment actions will encourage employers to attempt to insulate themselves from liability for workplace harassment by empowering only a handful of individuals to take tangible employment actions. 2257. Facts of the Case This case settles a question about the role of supervisor and its definition when used in cases submitted under the Title VII act that is to prevent discrimination based … 1:07-cv-0095-LRR (ND Iowa, Feb. 2, 2013), Dkt. Vance submitted a complaint to the University when a coworker used a racial epithet directed at her and African-American students at … As Chief of Boca Raton’s Marine Safety Division, Terry had authority to “hire new lifeguards (subject to the approval of higher management), to supervise all aspects of the lifeguards’ work assignments, to engage in counseling, to deliver oral reprimands, and to make a record of any such discipline.” Id., at 781. Vance, who worked as a cook at Ball State University in Indiana, says she was the victim of harassment by another Ball State employee who oversaw her daily work, but who lacked the power to fire, discipline, demote or transfer her. to Pet. See Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F. 3d 704, 717 (2006) (“The difficulty of classification in this case arises from the fact that Nayman, the shift supervisor, was in between the paradigmatic classes [of supervisor and co-worker]. The employer bears the burden of establishing this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. EEOC Guidance 405:7654. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. The negligence standard allowed by the Court, see ante, at 24, scarcely affords the protection the Faragher and Ellerth framework gave victims harassed by those in control of their lives at work. 1. And when an employer “concentrates all decisionmaking authority in a few individuals” who rely on information from “other workers who actually interact with the affected employee,” the other workers may rank as supervisors (or maybe not; the Court does not commit one way or the other). Monika Starke participated in the program. 2007) (hereinafter Lindemann & Grossman). Ibid. Issue. But sometimes the term is used to refer to lower ranking individuals. See Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 768-769 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing cases). Ante, at 22-24, and nn. But those differences reflect the NLRA's unique purpose, which is to preserve the balance of power between labor and management, see HCRA, supra, at 573 (explaining that Congress amended the NLRA to exclude supervisors in order to address the "imbalance between labor and management" that resulted when "supervisory employees could organize as part of bargaining units and negotiate with the employer"). VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY ET AL.(2013). 1, pp. The chef, Shannon Fultz, assigned tasks by preparing "prep lists" of daily duties. 1, ¶1, notwithstanding the fact that the court in that case applied the definition of "supervisor" that we adopt today, see EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F. 3d 657, 684 (CA8 2012). Maetta Vance, an African-American woman, began working for Ball State University (BSU) in 1989 as a substitute server in the University Banquet and Catering division of Dining Services. 646 F. 3d 461, 470–471 (2011); App. to Pet. The other view ranks as supervisors only those authorized to take tangible employment actions. And another employee testified to believing that Davis was “a supervisor.” Id., at 386. Id., at 65 (internal quotation marks omitted). 4  The United States urges us to defer to the EEOC Guidance. Donna Rhodes: Donna Rhodes, a seasonal highway maintainer for the Illinois Department of Transportation, was responsible for plowing snow during winter months. 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